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ABSTRACT
Assurance cases are structured arguments that are commonly used
to reason about the safety of a product or service. Currently, there
is an ongoing push towards using assurance cases for also cyberse-
curity, especially in safety critical domains, like automotive. While
the industry is faced with the challenge of defining a sound method-
ology to build security assurance cases, the state of the art is rather
immature. Therefore, we have conducted a thorough investiga-
tion of the (external) constraints and (internal) needs that security
assurance cases have to satisfy in the context of the automotive
industry. This has been done in the context of two large automotive
companies in Sweden. The end result is a set of recommendations
that automotive companies can apply in order to define security
assurance cases that are (i) aligned with the constraints imposed
by the existing and upcoming standards and regulations and (ii)
harmonized with the internal product development processes and
organizational practices. We expect the results to be also of inter-
est for product companies in other safety critical domains, like
healthcare, transportation, and so on.
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1 INTRODUCTION
An assurance case can be described as a structured set of arguments
that are supported by evidence, e.g., collected from the results of
the validation and verification activities [9]. A simple example is
given in Figure 1 and the reader could recognize the resemblance
with the logical argumentation of a legal case. Assurance cases have
been in use for several decades in order to argue for completeness
and correctness of various dependability attributes in a wide range
of industrial fields. In the automotive industry, assurance cases
for functional safety (or safety cases) are a common practice since
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the release of the ISO 26262 standard on functional safety for road
vehicles in 2011 [12]. The necessity to adopt assurance cases also
for cybersecurity is emerging in the automotive industry only now,
especially because of the upcoming release of security standards
that explicitly demand for them [14]. The necessity is also felt
from within the automotive industry. The vehicle industry is going
through a rapid transformation with features such as increased
connectivity and automated driving as two of the major driving
forces. Features like these demands various external interfaces
which exposes potential vulnerabilities in the connected devices
of the vehicles and increases the risks in a way that was never
seen before. Therefore, a more systematic way to “reason” around
security is desirable.
The push towards adopting security assurance cases represent
a challenge that is both technical and organizational at the same
time. For instance, the selection of a given argumentation strategy
(i.e., the structuring of the security case) is not a purely technical
choice, as it might require to re-organize the way the product is
developed, e.g., in order to introduce extra activities and work
products to create the necessary evidence. Such organizational
issues cannot be underestimated in large eco-systems, like the
development environment in vehicle manufacturers (OEM).
In our analysis of the literature, we have found that the related
work has not investigated the constraints and requirements around
high-impact technical decisions such as (i) how to structure a secu-
rity case, (ii) how to collaborate with suppliers on security cases,
(iii) how to effectively update a security case, and so on. Therefore,
in a collaboration between one academic institution and two OEMs,
we have performed a study of the industrial needs that pertain
the technical choice of adopting (or defining) a methodology for
security assurance cases in an automotive organization.
This paper has three main contributions. First, we have performed
a systematic study of the security-relevant regulations and stan-
dards in the automotive domain. In this analysis, we have identified
the explicit and implicit constraints laid out by such documents
with respect to security cases. We call these the external forces
driving the adoption of security cases. The analysis is performed
by a pool of industrial security experts (working in two panels)
who are also members of several standardization committees and,
hence, know how to interpret these documents, which are, at times,
somewhat fuzzy.
Second, we have performed an empirical study with a significant
number of stakeholders (more than 20 people) that are affected
either directly (e.g., as prospective producers) or indirectly (e.g.,
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Figure 1: A simple example of a security assurance case
as prospective consumers) by security assurance cases. By apply-
ing rigorous methods from the field qualitative research, we have
systematically identified the internal organizational needs and op-
portunities that must be taken in consideration for a successful
adoption of a security case methodology.
Third, we have combined the observations collected in the two
above-mentioned studies and translated them into a list of practical
recommendations on security cases for the automotive industry.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
providemore background on assurance cases and discuss the related
work. In Section 3, we formulate the research questions and describe
the researchmethodology. In Sections 4 and 5, we present the results.
In Section 6, we discuss the threats to the validity of our research. In
Section 7, we discuss the results and provide our recommendations.
Finally, in Section 8, we presents the concluding remarks.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Security Assurance Cases. The argumentation in a Security As-
surance Case (SAC) consists of claims about security for the system
in question, and the evidence to justify these security related claims.
A SAC consist of the following primary components: (i) security
claims, (ii) the context in which the claims should hold, (iii) an
argument about the security claim, (iv) the strategy used to build
the argument, and (v) A body of evidence to prove the claims [2, 15]
A SAC can be expressed in a textual or graphical format[2]. The
most common graphical formats are the Goal Structure Notation
(GSN, [23]), and the Claims Arguments, and Evidence notation
(CAE, [1]). Researchers have been exploring several approaches for
creating the argument part of SAC. Biao et al. [29] suggest dividing
the argument into different layers, and using different patterns to
argue in each of these layers, which include an asset layer, and a
threat layer. Another approach was used by Poreddy et al. [20],
which uses different security properties as argumentation strategy.
Other used approaches argue by development life-cycle phases [21],
standard recommendations [11], and product components [10].
Security Assurance Cases in Automotive. The review of lit-
erature shows very little use of assurance cases for security in the
automotive industry. One of the very few related studies is the
work by Cheah et al. [4]. The authors present a classification of
security test results using security severity ratings. These security
tests then form a body of evidence used as an input for constructing
a security assurance case. The study suggests a bottom-up approach
for constructing a security case, but does not provide a complete
example case to show how the body of evidence is connected to
claims. Another related study is the work by Fung et al. [8] which
studies maintaining assurance cases by using automated change
impact analysis. A tool was created for that purpose and a case
study was conducted in the automotive domain. The authors claim
the tool can be used for both safety and security. However, the
example case in the paper is only about safety.
Safety Assurance Cases in Automotive. Safety cases have
been in use in the automotive industry for several years. In the
second edition of the ISO 26262 standard [13] it is stated that release
for production shall only be approved if there is “sufficient evidence
for confidence in the achievement of functional safety” and that
this could be provided by the safety case. This clearly shows the
importance of a safety case. Birch et al. [3] perform an industrial
case study focusing on the product-related arguments of a safety
case as opposed to the process-related arguments, which according
to the authors often gets the overhand. The authors discuss the
outcome of the case study listing challenges and advantages. They
mention how the engineers that design the system may benefit
from the safety case compilation throughout the project, especially
the product-related part, and address issues in a timely manner.
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study was conducted in two large automotive OEMs located
in Sweden. Company A is a passenger car manufacturer, while
Company B is a truck manufacturer.
3.1 Research Questions
This work is motivated by the urgency that is currently perceived
by the automotive industry with respect to implementing security
assurance cases. This is due to the emergence of several standards
and regulations that are forcing the industry to develop a method-
ology for SAC in order to stay compliant and avoid legal risks. We
call these the external drivers that will impose constraints on how
SAC should look like. Accordingly, we formulate the first research
question as follows:
RQ1. What are the constraints for SAC coming from regulations
and standards in the automotive markets of EU, US, and China?
The need to develop a strategy for SAC is also perceived by
the automotive companies as an opportunity to improve their cy-
bersecurity development process. Also, such methodology should
integrate with the product lifecycle. As such, we have investigated
these internal drivers. Accordingly, we formulate the second re-
search question as follows:
RQ2. What are the needs and opportunities related to security
assurance cases in the automotive industry?
3.2 Methodology
As shown in Table 1, this study involved a total of 28 participants.
RQ1. Concerning the analysis of the standards and regulation,
Company A maintains a knowledge base of relevant documents
as part of their security governance framework. This knowledge
base consist of standards, regulations, guidelines, best practices, etc
applicable for various markets. Furthermore, this knowledge base
covers both current and upcoming trends. We assume that such
knowledge base is fairly complete, at least for the most relevant
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Table 1: List of the participants
RQ1 RQ2
ID Company Role Analysis of standards Pre-study Workshop Prioritization Interviews
and Regulations
1 Company A Attribute Leaders ✓ ✓
2 Company A Regulatory experts ✓ ✓
3 Company A Safety experts ✓ ✓
4 Company A Security R&D experts ✓ ✓
5 Company A Product Owner Security ✓ ✓
6 Company A Security Engineers ✓ ✓
7 Company B Security expert ✓ ✓
8 Company B Security expert ✓ ✓
9 Company B Safety expert ✓ ✓
10 Company B Security Engineer ✓
11 Company B Software architect ✓
12 Company B Principal Engineer ✓
13 Company B Software Engineer ✓
14 Company B Security Engineer ✓
15 Company B Security Engineer ✓
16 Company B Security Engineer ✓ ✓
17 Company B Security Engineer ✓ ✓
18 Company B Security expert ✓ ✓(facilitator)
19 Company B Solution Train Engineer (STE) ✓(stakeholder)
20 Company B Solution Manager ✓(stakeholder)
21 Company B Functional Safety Assessor ✓ ✓(stakeholder)
22 Company B Component Owner ✓(stakeholder)
23 Company B Senior Legal Counsel ✓(stakeholder)
24 Company B Security expert ✓ ✓
25 Company B Security Manager ✓ ✓
26 Company B Security R&D ✓
27 University C Researcher ✓ ✓(interviewer)
28 University C Researcher ✓
markets (e.g., US, EU, China). Furthermore, this knowledge base
includes, among other things, information regarding the categoriza-
tion of requirements, their relevance, the parts of the organization
that is affected, and which life-cycle phases of the products are
impacted. This knowledge base represented the pool of documents
we have analyzed in order to answer RQ1.
In particular, in this study we prioritize new regulations and
standards that will soon come into effect and focus on the markets
mentioned above. The filtered documents (listed in Section 4) have
been analyzed for explicit references to security assurance cases or
their parts. We also looked for implicit relationships to SAC. For
instance, in the SELF DRIVE Act [17] there is a demand that manu-
factures must have a Cybersecurity Plan that includes, among other
things, processes for identification, assessment and mitigation of
vulnerabilities (that are reasonably foreseeable). A SAC can then be
used to show how this requirement is fulfilled listing the demanded
processes and the evidence for them.
RQ2. To understand the internal needs for security assurance
cases in the automotive industry, we used a three-steps method, as
shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2:Method used to get the industrial needs for security
assurance cases
Pre-study. The goal of the pre-study was to assess the overall
industrial expectations with regards to SAC. In particular, the pre-
study reflects the point of view of the security leaders in the two
companies participating to this investigation. In each company and
independently from each other, a panel of experts performed a
series of brainstorming meetings. The goal of the brainstorming
was to form a consensual opinion of how the SAC should ‘look and
feel’, within each company and from the perspective of security
people. The results of the two panels were compared and merged
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into a single list of requirements and constraints, with the support
of University C.
The panels consisted of R&D personnel (i.e., technical leaders)
with expertise in both security and safety. Further, the participants
were all familiar with the concept of assurance cases. As a conse-
quence, these groups of people were very homogeneous and might
not have been aware of the full spectrum of needs and expectations
in their two large companies. Therefore, we decided to perform a
larger study (comprising a workshop and a series of interviews),
involving a larger and more diverse set of stakeholders1. In Section
5 we present the results from both the pre-study and the larger
study, and we compare the observations.
Workshop. The first step in our studywas conducting aworkshop
to elicit usage scenarios related to security assurance cases. The
workshop was conducted at Company B. We invited stakeholders
from different backgrounds and different parts of the organization.
As shown in Table 1, in total, we had 12 participants and three
moderators contributing. We started the workshop with a presenta-
tion to introduce security assurance cases to the participant which
did not have previous experience with them. We then divided the
participants into three groups of 4 participants, making sure to
spread similar roles and competences among the groups, e.g., we
had three participant who were familiar with safety cases, so we
assigned them to different groups. We asked the groups to brain-
storm for 45 minutes on usage scenarios for security assurance
cases, and to describe them as user stories, like “As a «role» I would
use security assurance cases for «usage»” [6]. We explicitly asked
the participants to come up with real-life scenarios in the context
of their company.
Prioritization and Interviews. At this step, we wanted to dig
deeper and get a better understanding of the most important sce-
narios. We also wanted to acquire the point of view of more diverse
stakeholders. Hence we had to prioritize the scenario and identify
stakeholders to be interviewed for the top ones.
Concerning the prioritization, we aimed at getting expert opin-
ions on which usage scenarios are of most value to the company,
from a security perspective. As shown in Table 1, we sent out the
scenarios collected from the workshop to 10 security experts and
asked them to select the top five scenarios by assigning a rank from
1 to 5 to them, where 5 is assigned to the most valuable scenario
for the company.
Afterwards, we selected, the top five usage scenarios and identi-
fied a key stakeholder at company B for each. Finally, we conducted
in-person interviews with these stakeholders. Note that at the in-
terviews, a security expert from the company was also present as a
facilitator of the discussion. The interviewees were selected based
on the relevance of their expertise to the actors of the user stories
in the corresponding usage scenarios. For example, the actor of one
of our top usage scenarios is a legal risk owner, hence, we selected
an interviewee who has extensive experience in law and has the
role: senior legal counsel in Company B.
We organized each interview into four parts, according to the
following themes:
1The study has been performed only in Company B, due to resource constraints.
i value In the first part, we focus on the value that SAC might
bring to the stakeholder in terms of, e.g., efficiency, and quality
management. The objective of the discussion is to picture the
âĂŸstatus quoâĂŹ (e.g., to understand how the level of security
is currently appraised) and the expectations (i.e., how things
should improve).
ii content and structure The focus of this part is to get the inter-
viewees’ technical opinions on how the content and structure
of SAC should be, e.g., in terms of level of detail and types of
claims;
iii integration This part is about understanding how SAC could
be integrated with the current way of working, and whether it
could fit in the current activities, or would require modifications
to the process; and
iv challenges and opportunities The last part of the interview
is about understanding the challenges and opportunities that
the stakeholders foresee in applying SAC.
In each interview, there was an interviewer (an author), an in-
terviewee, and a security expert who acted as a discussion enabler
(also an author). We recorded the interviews, and used the record-
ings to extract a transcript for each interview. These were then
sent to the corresponding interviewees validation, and additional
comments.
4 RQ1: EXTERNAL DRIVERS
In this section we look at external drivers that put requirements on
the automotive industry. These drivers include regulations, stan-
dards, best-practises, and guidelines. The intent of the analysis is to
find the relation and the motivation of a SAC from these documents.
We look at some of the current documentation as well as some up-
coming ones. We do not present a complete list, but rather look at
the ones that may have a large impact on the subject and the field
of interest. These are presented in Table 2. The first three columns
in the table indicate how SAC is referenced in the document, i.e.,
whether it is explicitly or implicitly mentioned, or whether it is
beneficial for the purpose of the document. The rest of the table
categorizes the documents in terms of type (regulation, standard,
guideline, or best-practice) and market. The last four columns indi-
cate whether the document requires compliance or conformance,
and whether the document targets the process or the product.
There are both general and specific legislation and regulations
regarding security and privacy that are applicable to the automotive
industry. An example of the former is the European General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [7] and the Chinese equivalent GB/T
35273 [24], although a recommendation. Below we describe the
relation between these documents and SAC.
Two of the analyzed documents explicitlymentions SAC: ISO/SAE
21434 DIS [14] and SAE J3061 [22]. The former gives requirements
on a cybersecurity case and that it shall provide the arguments
that cybersecurity is achieved. The latter states that a cybersecu-
rity case provides evidence and argumentation that design and
implementation is sufficiently secure.
The Safely Ensuring Lives Future Deployment and Research In
Vehicle Evolution (SELF DRIVE) Act [17] contains requirements
stating that a Cybersecurity plan that includes various security
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Table 2: External drivers and references
SAC reference motivation Categorization
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✓ ISO/SAE 21434 DIS [14] Standard International ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ SAE J3061 [22] Guideline International ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ SELF DRIVE Act [17] Regulation US ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ ADS 2.0 [16] Best-practise US ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ AV 3.0 [28] Best-practise US ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ GDPR [7] Regulation Europe ✓ ✓
✓ SPY Car Act [18] Regulation US ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ CCPA [25] Regulation US ✓ ✓
✓ UNECE GRVA CS [26] Regulation International ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ UNECE GRVA OTA [27] Regulation International ✓ ✓ ✓
✓ ICV [5] Standard China ✓ ✓
✓ GB/T 35273 [24] Standard China ✓ ✓
✓ CSL [19] Regulation China ✓ ✓
activities shall be developed. It thus implies that it shall be possible
to show that the plan also has been implemented. The SAC shall
therefor contain the corresponding evidence and argumentation
of how the security plan has been met, including confidence in
process for incident handling. Similarly, for the Automated Driv-
ing Systems (ADS 2.0) [16] it is beneficial to show evidence that
cybersecurity processes are followed and show that the company
adheres to industry best practice. The authors of the (ADS 2.0) doc-
ument encourage documentation of how cybersecurity has been
reached, including design choices, analyses, testing, etc. The SAC
shall therefor cover these aspects. The Automated Vehicles 3.0 [28]
also indicates the benefit to show evidence that cybersecurity pro-
cesses are followed and show that the company adheres to industry
best practice, including design principles and incident handling.
The SAC shall therefor contain the corresponding evidence and
argumentation of how security has been considered and handled
during design and confidence in processes for incidence handling.
There is a current initiative on UN level, prepared by a subgroup
of the working group on Intelligent Transport Systems / Automated
Driving (IWG ITS/AD) of WP.29, referred to as “UN Task Force on
Cyber security and OTA issues” (TF-CS/OTA), to establish regula-
tions and type approval on Cybersecurity for vehicles that includes
vehicle categories; M (standard passenger vehicles) and N (trucks).
This include “Regulation on uniform provisions concerning the
approval of cyber security” [26] and “Regulation on uniform provi-
sions concerning the approval of software update processes” [27].
For the former it can be seen as highly beneficial to show compli-
ance and conformance to requirements in the regulation concerning
process implementation and fulfillment as well as demonstration
of performed verification activities and its outcome. The SAC shall
therefor contain evidence and argumentation in regards to confi-
dence in the implemented processes that shall cover the life-cycle
of the vehicle to maintain an appropriate level of security. As well
as product evidence and argumentation of an adequately secure
product. The latter one contain requirements for demonstration of
evidence of a secure update process. The SAC shall therefor contain
evidence and argumentation in regards to confidence in the SW
update processes in order to maintain an adequately secure product
and acceptable level of risk.
Further, for the privacy related documents: General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR) [7]; Security and Privacy in Your Car
(SPY CAR) Act [18]; Chinese Information Security Technology âĂŞ
Personal Information Security Specification GB/T 35273 [24]; and
California Consumer Privacy Act [25], SAC can be beneficial in
regards to showing compliance to regulation, processes, methods
and technologies to secure handling of data. The SAC shall therefor
contain evidence and argumentation in regards to confidence in the
processes as well as implementation measures of handling private
data.
SAC can also be beneficial in the China Cyber Security Law
(CSL) [19] to show that the organization has sufficient policies and
processes that handle cybersecurity. Including incident handling
and secure handling of private data. The SAC shall therefor con-
tain evidence and argumentation in regards to confidence in the
post-production processes. The CSL is a high level law and more
detailed requirements will exist through the Chinese strategy and
framework on Intelligent and Connected Vehicles (ICV) [5]. With
the same reasoning it can be beneficial with the ICV in regards to
showing compliance and conformance to requirements and pro-
cesses, methods and design/technology. The SAC shall therefor
contain evidence and argumentation of confidence in the imple-
mented measures and processes to maintain an adequately secure
product and acceptable level of risk.
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Figure 3: Usage scenarios for the life-cycle of an automotive
product
5 RQ2: INTERNAL NEEDS AND
OPPOTUNITIES
5.1 Pre-study: Expectations of Security Leaders
The panels of security experts concluded that the internal needs of
an OEM in regards to the use of assurance cases for cybersecurity
can be summarized as follows.
Secure product argumentation. Need to have an argumentation
for adequately secure implementations of HW/SW E/E systems in
their vehicle throughout their life-cycle. This can be used, among
other things, to make release decisions.
Supporting evidence. Need to have all the necessary evidence
that the implemented systems are secure enough in order to release
a vehicle to the end-customers. In particular, the evidence should
undergo a quality assurance process and should cover all the rele-
vant parts included in the development, with sufficient detail for
the critical parts.
Legal compliance. Comply to the legislation, regulations and type
approvals on national and international levels (in order to even be
allowed to sell vehicles).
Supply chain. Manage collaboration between OEM and suppliers
in terms of requirements, structure, aggregation and level of details
for SAC constituents.
Standard conformance. Conform to standards, guidelines and
best practices and implement state of the art processes and methods
(in order to be competitive w.r.t. other OEMs).
Process harmonization. Existing development processes and the
way of working need to be harmonized with the processes and
methods required by SAC. One such example may be an agile way
of working and product organization.
5.2 Workshop to Identify Broad Usage
Scenarios
The workshop participants (working in three parallel group ses-
sions) identified thirteen unique usage scenarios (US), which are
listed below in no particular order. These scenarios depict, in a nar-
rative forms, the broader set of needs and expectations of an OEM
with respect to SAC. These scenarios cover a diverse set of stake-
holders (10 different roles) within the OEM organization, which is,
typically, a very large one.
When looking at the suggested usage scenarios, we can see
that they span over multiple phases in an automotive product’s life-
cycle. Figure 3 shows a high-level view of the different phases in the
automotive product’s life-cycle and the usage scenarios suggested
in each phase. As the figure shows, the participant were able to
identify at least one usage scenario in each phase except for the
final decommission phase.
US 1 As a salesman, I would use top-level SAC to prove to our
customers that the company has considered all relevant security
aspects of the final product, and has enough evidence to claim that
it has fulfilled them.
US 2 As a member of the compliance team, I would use detailed
SAC to prove to authorities that the company has complied to a
certain standard, legislation, etc., and show them evidence of my
claim of compliance.
US 3 As a project manager, I would use SAC to make sure that
a project is ready from a security point of view to be closed and
shipped to production.
US 4 As a project manager, I would include SAC in my project plan.
I would make sure the project has the needed resources and time
for creating the case (argumentation, evidence collection, etc.).
US 5 As a project would use SAC to monitor the progress of my
project when it comes to fulfillment of security requirements.
US 6 As a product owner, I would use SAC to make an assessment
of the quality of my product from a security perspective, and make
a roadmap for future security development.
US 7 As a product owner, responsible for handling threats and
vulnerabilities, I would use SAC to evaluate the effect of new threats
and vulnerabilities, and evaluate whether a change is needed to the
product.
US 8 As a member of the purchase team, I would include SAC as a
part of the contracts made with suppliers, in order to have evidence
of the fulfillment of security requirements at delivery time, and to
track progress during development time.
US 9 As an action owner, I would use detailed and visual SAC to
communicate with the risk owner, and decide how to update the
product security in the right way (to know what to do)
US 10 As a system leader, I would use SAC to make an assessment
of the quality of my system from a security perspective, and make
a roadmap for future security development (same as US6, but on
wider scope).
US 11 As a software developer, I would use SAC from previous
similar projects as a guideline for secure development practices.
US 12 As a legal risk owner, I would use SAC in court if a legal case
is raised against the company for security related issues. I would
use the SAC to prove that sufficient preventive actions were taken.
US 13 As a member of the corporate communication team, I would
use SAC as a reference to answer security related questions.
5.3 Prioritisation of Scenarios and In-depth
Interviews
As mentioned in the methodology, after the workshop we sent the
scenarios to experts and asked them to prioritize them based on
the value the scenarios provide to the company. The result of the
prioritization task is shown in Table 4. For the top five scenarios, we
identified the key stakeholders for those scenarios and conducted
in-depth interviews.
Interview on US3 and US6 – Product delivery and process im-
provement. The interview was conducted with two interviewees,
Security Assurance Cases for Road Vehicles Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
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Figure 4: Prioritized usage scenarios
to tackle two of the usage scenarios, as explained in the method-
ology 3.2. The interviewees were one solution train engineer and
one solution manager (participants 19 and 20 in Table 1).
“[SAC provides] an opportunity for the company to build
a reputation of building secure vehicles." (Participant 19)
The interviewees said that today, the security assurance in projects
is mostly based on experience, and is done by providing evidence
such as test reports for some claims. These claims are derived from
projects’ requirements are not put together in a structured way.
The interviewees also stressed that what is done today is simply not
sufficient given the rapid evolution of connectivity in the vehicles.
Historically there has been “a trust in the physical shell (the cab)
around the items in the vehicle.”, but today these items are connected
to the outside world, and can be a target for cyber attacks.
As per the interviewees, having SACs as a part of scoping projects,
setting the milestones and deliverables, and connecting them to the
development process, would be of great value to security assurance
from a project management perspective. Additionally from a prod-
uct point of view, having a holistic SAC which is updated by the
related projects would give the product owner an understanding
of how secure the product is at different time-points, e.g., after
integrating changes from different projects.
Both interviewees agreed that SACs should be built on a prod-
uct level rather than a project level. SACs should be integrated
and built within projects, but only to contribute towards the prod-
uct’s SAC. A product, however, may be big and complex, and may
include items that are more interesting from a security perspective
than others, e.g., Electrical Control Units (ECU) that are connected
to the outside world in a vehicle. In this case there needs to be a
severity assessment to focus on the right items.
The interviewees think that the SAC work can be integrated into
the project manager’s and product owner’s work by capturing it
in projects’ requirements. They emphasized that it is important
to work on quality, e.g., security as a part of the development
process, and not as a separate activity. The workload in the
beginning will be high, but with time, there will be patterns that
can be reused to build SAC with less effort.
When it comes to the challenges, the interviewees consider han-
dling the complexity of the product (vehicle in this case), and finding
right competences to be the main ones. Other challenges include
securing a buy-in to work with SAC all the way from upper man-
agement to development teams.
Interview on US2 – Compliance. The interview was conducted
with a functional safety assessor who has awide range of experience
in compliance (participant 21 in Table 1).
“The security case can serve as an umbrella document for
all the analysis documents. It can be used by an assessor to
find the right documents in order to assess compliance to a
standard." (Participant 21)
In the current situation, the compliance team is only concernedwith
safety matters, as per the interviewee. The only involvement with
security issues is when there is a breach which affects the product’s
safety. The expectation is that SAC can serve as an umbrella
document for all the analysis documents. Hence it can be used
by an assessor to find related document to assess compliance to a
certain standard.
The SAC should be created on a whole vehicle level, as per
the interviewee. It needs, however, to be dividable in manage-
able pieces, i.e., pieces that can be managed by individuals, which
would be responsible for the corresponding part of the SAC. For
compliance purposes, the authorities look at system level, hence,
for every project that includes changes in the system, it is important
to conduct an impact analysis to identify affected artefacts, and
update the SAC accordingly.
How working with SAC can be integrated within the way of
working of the compliance team depends much on how SACs are
implemented. If they are integrated within the projects (as they
should according to the interviewee), then the compliance team
would have the responsibility of following them up throughout the
project, as well as making sure that they are complete after the
verification phase.
The interviewee considers the main challenge to be finding re-
sources and competences to carry out the work related to creating,
maintaining, assessing and supporting SACs.
Interview on US8 – Suppliers. The interviewwas conductedwith a
component owner in Company B, who is experienced in purchasing
and working with suppliers (ID 22 in Table 1).
“[Working with SAC provides] An opportunity to catch
up with suppliers, which in many cases have come further in
thinking about security than the company."
(Participant 22)
Today, security assurance when working with suppliers is about
making sure of the fulfillment of security requirement, and running
test cases on a sample of the requirements. However, “there is an
uncertainty to a large extent that the received software is secure”, as
per the interviewee. On the other hand, safety critical functions, e.g.,
breaking, is handled differently. The suppliers are usually asked
to show how requirements are broken down and implemented
during regular review sessions. In some cases, suppliers are asked
to provide safety cases, which are used together with the internal
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safety cases to make sure that the claims align. The interviewee
expects that SAC can be used in the same manner as safety cases.
Additionally, they can be used to communicate regarding security
both with suppliers and internally, and as a supporting artifact
for creating security requirements.
Regarding the granularity of the cases, the interviewee distin-
guishes between two types of SAC: the ones created at the supplier’s
end, and the ones created by the company. On the supplier’s side the
cases should be on the ECU level, followed by a threat-based level.
Whereas the company-owned SACs should be on the complete
vehicle level, and broken down to ECU level, which is contributed
by the suppliers. An important aspect mentioned by the intervie-
wee is the weighting of the claims based on severity. This is to be
able to prioritize the claims during the follow up sessions with the
suppliers, and when testing the implementation.
Integrating SAC in the current way of working with suppliers
would increase the workload, but there are no obvious conflicts,
according to the interviewee. However, there is a need for tools to
store, extract, and compare SACs. Additionally, a version handling
tool is also required to keep track of the SACs and their changes.
The interviewee also mentioned the need to use an exchange-
able format when building the cases, on both ends (supplier and
company), in order to compare and integrate them.
A challenge is to find and provide practical training on SAC in the
industrial context. Another challenge mentioned by the interviewee
is finding resources with the right competences to carry out the
SAC related work. The interviewee emphasized that based on the
experience from safety, even when there is education about the
cases, it was much more complicated when actual work was done.
Interview on US12 – Legal. The interview was conducted with a
senior legal counsel at Company B (participant 23 in Table 1).
“An evidence based structured approach to argue about
security would definitely be used as evidence in court."
(Participant 23)
In the current situation, the company has not had any legal case
for security related issues, but there have been functional-safety
related cases claiming that feature malfunctioning have caused
accidents. Current evidence used in court for these kinds of legal
cases are of two types: (i) usage of technology according to an
acceptable standard; (ii) implementations of the used standards and
technologies are correctly done (this should be certified by a third
party assessor). Hence, if the ISO 21434 [14] becomes an industry
standards, then it can be used as an evidence in court. However, it
is very important to assure the quality of the case when it comes
to completeness in the argumentation and evidence. The SAC used
as an evidence will be available to the opponents, and it could be
exploited to find holes and error to be used against the company.
The granularity needed for the SAC depends pretty much on the
legal case according to the interviewee. However, there is a need
to create SACs for complete vehicles, and views that could be
broken down. This is to avoid cases where a legal case against the
company involves a composition of systems (end-to-end function),
and SACs are created for a subset of these systems. This would be
a weakness if they are used as evidence.
The creation of SACs should, from a company perspective, be
during development to assure security, according to the intervie-
wee. However, from a legal perspective, SACs can be created once
a legal case is filed, but that could lead to questions asking why the
SACs were not created during development. Additionally, it would
increase the probability of the risk of having insufficient evidence,
as it would be harder to locate and assign them. Moreover, from a
liability perspective, it is much better to create the SAC proactively.
As per the interviewee, if SACs are to be used as evidence, the
relevant stakeholders in the company will be reached out and asked
to provide the SACs when needed. Then the legal responsible will
have meetings with the stakeholders to understand it. This means
that the ownership of the SACs would not be the responsibility of
the legal responsible, even if it is created specially for a legal case.
The legal responsible would be a user of the SAC.
At the end, the interviewee stressed that introducing a structured
way of security assurance ”can lead to creating better systems which
can protect the company from issues from regulators and third parties.”.
However, there has to be a buy-in on different levels in the company
in order to do this in a correct way.
6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
In terms of external validity, we are aware that the general validity
of our results could be limited to the companies involved in the
study. Also, the companies are from the same country. Therefore,
the results might not directly translate to companies with a differ-
ent culture. However, the involved companies are of high profile,
quite large and compete at the international level. Therefore, they
are able to provide a quite broad perspective on the entire automo-
tive industry. In any case, the results presented in this paper are
an important first important step towards a larger survey study
involving more companies and professionals, internationally.
In terms of internal validity we consider the following aspects.
First, the selection of the standards and regulations investigated
in RQ1 could have been incomplete. However, we are confident
we are adressing the most important documents, especially for the
mentioned markets (EU, China, US). Second, in the prioritization of
the scenarios of RQ2, there is a risk that the selection of the top sce-
narios was biased by present market pressure towards compliance
to the upcoming standards. Third, elements of bias could be have
been introduced via the selection of the participants. The same lim-
itation applies to the participants of the interviews, as the selection
of participants was based on expertise and availability (convenience
sampling). All in all, we have a balance mix of participants with dif-
ferent types of expertise: security, product development, business,
and legal. This provides us with enough confidence that the results
are representative of the expectations and needs across the studied
companies.
7 DISCUSSION
As this study contains different parts, we think it might be useful
to the reader to if we illustrated how the different results relate to
each other. Further, we translate the results into a concrete set of
recommendations for the OEMs.
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Table 3: Traceability of the results in this study
Internal needs: pre-study Internal needs: Usage scenario External needs
Secure product argumentation US3, US5, US6, US7, US9, US10, US11 [14], [22]
Supporting evidence US2, US8, US11, US12 [14], [22]
Legal compliance US2, US8 [7], [17], [18], [19], [25], [26], [27]
Supply chain US2, US3, US5, US8 [7], [14], [16], [22], [24], [26], [27], [28]
Standard conformance US6, US8, US10, US11 [5], [14], [16], [22], [24], [28]
Process harmonization US4, US5
— US1, US13
7.1 Mapping of Results
Table 3 shows a mapping of the results we got from the different
parts of this study: the internal needs from the pre-study, the usage
scenarios, and the external needs. As an example of the mapping,
using SAC as Supporting evidence is identified as an internal need
in the pre-study. It relates to multiple usage scenarios, e.g., US12,
where SAC can be used as a piece of evidence in case of a legal suit.
It also relates to the ISO/SAE 21434 DIS [14] standard and the SAE
J3061 [22] best practice which explicitly require SAC with evidence
on secure design and implementation.
As shown in the table, the results are not heterogeneous, but
rather align to a large extent. Every internal needs identified by
the experts in the pre-study is linked to at least one of the usage
scenarios, as well as one external driver, with the exception of the
Process harmonization need. The table shows how the scenarios
proved to be useful tool to obtain a deeper view into the internal
needs and in detailing the high-level needs identified in the pre-
study. On the other hand, the table also show that the scenarios go
beyond the high-level needs identified by the security leaders, by
broadening the scope of the analysis. In particular, two additional
scenarios (US1 and US13) suggest using an abstracted level of SAC
to communicate and answer security related questions both from
inside the company and from potential customers.
7.2 Recommendations
As a summary of the findings of this study, we provide our recom-
mendations for companies (particularly, OEMs) that are starting
to work with security assurance cases. These recommendations
are not complete solutions, but rather steps towards establishing a
ground to integrate SAC with the companies’ way of working, and
to help different stakeholders make use of SAC.
Standards and Regulations – Cover both process and product. Sev-
eral of the security-related standards/regulations contain both re-
quirements on processes and the product. The processes include
how to develop the product in a secure manner as well as keep-
ing the product secure after its release. In some cases the product
requirements even suggests what kind of measure that should be
considered. Since both standards and regulations put requirements
on audits and assessments of processes and products, including
certification of security processes, the SAC can function as the tool
for showing both compliance and conformance to those require-
ments. Privacy related standards/regulations foremost imply that
processes shall be in place in order to handle private data in a se-
cure manner. This also means having the appropriate measure in
place in order to accomplish this. The conclusion is thus that the
SAC shall contain arguments and evidence both that the processes
are sufficient and that the implementations of mechanisms that
handle private data are secure. Some of the regulations mentioned
in Table 2 that foremost requires processes for handling of data,
such as [7], [25] and [24] can implicitly be considered as product
requirements since there will also be a need for implementation of
security mechanisms that for example encrypt data during transfer.
Granularity of SAC – Whole product over sub-projects. In indus-
tries producing complex products, e.g., automotive, it is common
that the products are organized in multiple projects. Additionally,
the changes to these products are also done using projects (com-
monly called delta projects). In this case, SACs should be created on
a product level rather than a project level to fulfill the usage scenar-
ios identified in our study. When a SAC is created within a project,
it has to be integrated later with the product’s SAC. They should,
however, be built in a way which allows different stakeholders to
have different views corresponding to different abstraction levels.
Creation of SAC – No retro-fitting and no silos. It is possible to
build SAC for existing products, but going forward, it is important
to embed the work on SAC into the development process at the
organization. Security cases can provide real value to an organi-
zation if it is not just considered as a “check-in-the-box” activity,
or, worse, an overhead. Security cases can be used as a methodol-
ogy for guiding the work of cybersecurity and communicating its
importance across the teams. The work on Security cases should
include a large part of the organization, with different teams work-
ing on different parts of the security case, e.g., teams working on
the system, component, and functional levels. This requires to have
clear collaboration interfaces to avoid issues such as inconsisten-
cies, and conflicts. Moreover, each case should have an owner (even
SACs that consist of multiple sub-cases), which should be made
explicit to all teams working on the cases. This owner would drive
the work on the SAC and be responsible for its maintenance and
quality control. However, in order for this to work, there must be
a buy-in on different level of the organization, starting from top
management, and continuing all the way through the organization
to the development teams. Additionally, the importance of tool
support and automation should not be underestimated.
Quality of SAC – Actively assess completeness and confidence. Se-
curity assurance cases are going to serve multiple purposes within
the organization (see the diversity in the usage scenarios) and they
can be used in contexts that have different levels of criticality (e.g.,
legal case vs process improvement). Therefore, it must be clear
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what the quality level of each SAC is, so that they are not used
in the wrong context. We recommend to introduce measures to
assess the quality of the SACs. These may include, for example,
the completeness of the argumentation, and the level of confidence
in the evidence. This is emphasized by the security experts in the
pre-study (second bullet in Section 5.1), as well as all the inter-
viewees. However, in some of our identified usage scenarios, this
becomes even more important. For example when SAC are used
as evidence in court, they would be available to the oppositions as
well, meaning that any flaw could back-fire against the company.
Hence, it is very important to be able to assess the quality of a SAC
before using it in court.
SAC and suppliers – A common language is key to smooth col-
laboration. When it comes to working with suppliers, the SAC
should be built using an exchangeable format. This is to enable
the SAC created by the suppliers to be integrated with the SAC of
the corresponding product. Another important aspect is to add an
assessment of the severity level of the claims. This is to be able to
followup on the most severe items, when it is not possible to do a
complete followup.
SAC and suppliers – Plan for shared ownership. The suppliers
might require to keep parts of the SAC private (e.g., some evidence).
In this case, it is important to have a mechanism to keep ensuring
the overall quality of the SAC, e.g., by introducing a black-box
with meta-information such as the validity of the items behind
the box. Additionally, the ownership of the whole case has to be
considered, as the complete SAC would not be in the hands of a
single stakeholder. For instance, using a SAC in a legal case would
require a disclosure process in order to compile a SAC frommultiple
sources and multiple owners.
Miscellanea – With opportunities come challenges. Working with
SAC is not trivial and comes with many challenges. Traceability and
change analysis were considered main challenges by the majority
of the participants. Additionally, finding the right competences to
carry out the SAC-related work, role identification and description,
and acquiring the right tools and integrating them in the organiza-
tions tool chain were also considered major challenges.
8 CONCLUSION
In this study, we have analyzed the requirements around the use of
security assurance cases in the automotive domain. In particular, we
have listed the constraints coming from standards & regulations and
have identified the internal needs of OEMs. We have concluded this
work by translating the results in a number of pragmatic recommen-
dations for OEMs. These are valuable and necessary contributions
for the overall furthering of the automotive industry and for a more
effective and secure development of future road vehicles.
In future work, we plan on extending this work with a survey
including a larger group of automotive companies and automotive
security experts. Additionally, we are addressing the requirements
identified in this paper by means of a systematic methodology to
create security assurance cases for the automotive industry.
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